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Towards a Jurisprudence of a Third Kind-
"One Country, Two Systems"
Denis Chang*
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 1984, the Sino-British settlement on the question of Hong
Kong was reached in the form of a Joint Declaration and three An-
nexes.' Hong Kong will be restored to China on July 1, 1997 and be-
come a Special Administrative Region ("S.A.R.") under the direct
authority of the Central People's government with a promise of "a high
degree of autonomy."2 Apart from foreign affairs and defense which are
the responsibilities of the Central People's government, the Hong Kong
S.A.R. will be vested with executive, legislative and judicial powers, in-
cluding that of final adjudication.3 A mini-constitution or Basic Law for
the Hong Kong S.A.R. will be enacted by the National People's Con-
gress ("N.P.C.") pursuant to article 31 of the constitution of the People's
Republic of China ("P.R.C."). 4 The Basic Law will provide for the con-
tinuity 9f Hong Kong's capitalist system and life style for fifty years be-
yond 1997. Hong Kong's laws and judicial system-which belong to
the common law family of legal systems-will remain basically un-
changed, albeit stripped of colonial elements incompatible with Hong
Kong's future political order.6
* Barrister-at-law, Q.C. (Hong Kong), Lincoln's Inn; Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Associ-
ation (Jan. 1985-Jan. 1988); an Executive Committee Member of the Consultative Committee of the
Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administration Region of the People's Republic of China and
a Convenor of its Special Group on Law.
1 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec.
19, 1984, United Kingdom-People's Republic of China, 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20, (Cmd. 9352)
[hereinafter Joint Declaration], reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1371 (1984) (within the British White Paper
referred to as the "Draft Agreement"). The Joint Declaration was initialed on Sept. 29, 1984, signed
on Dec. 18, 1984, and ratified on May 27, 1985. Annex I of the Joint Declaration is an elaboration
by the P.R.C. government of its "basic policies" regarding Hong Kong; Annex II concerns the
setting up of a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group; and Annex III deals with land leases.
2 Id. paras. 1, 2, 3(2). The United Kingdom has since enacted the 1985 Hong Kong Act to
provide for the transfer of governance.
3 Id. para. 3(2)-(3); id. Annex I, § I.
4 Id. para. 3(12); id. Annex I, § I.
5 Id. para. 3(5); id. Annex I, § I.
6 The 1966 Application of English Law Ordinance, No. 2, ch.'88 provides that the common
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The Hong Kong S.A.R. is clearly intended to be a model of the
concept of "one country, two systems" put forward by Chinese leader
Deng Xiaoping as an instrument of China's reunification and moderniza-
tion.7 Some of the problems currently encountered in the drafting of the
Basic Law8 for the Hong Kong S.A.R. go to the very core of the concept
and test its coherence. Among the most crucial problems in jurispruden-
tial terms are the application of laws of the P.R.C. to the S.A.R.,9 the
interpretation of the Basic Law and other matters that touch upon the
law (defined in the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance ch.1 as the common law of Eng-
land) and the rules of equity shall be in force in Hong Kong insofar as they may be applicable to the
circumstances of Hong Kong or its inhabitants and subject to such modifications as circumstances
may require. However, there are exceptions to the extent that such common law or rules of equity
may from time to time be modified or excluded by 1) any local ordinance, 2) any U.K. order-in-
council which applies to Hong Kong, or 3) any U.K. act of Parliament which by express provision or
by necessary implication applies to Hong Kong. For a detailed analysis of the effect and history of
ch. 88 and general discussion of reception of English law in Hong Kong, see P. Wesley-Smith, The
Reception of English Law in Hong Kong (unpublished manuscript presented at the Conference on
the Common Law in Asia, Dec. 15-17, 1986, University of Hong Kong).
The paper begins with the following observation:
It seems implicit in the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong that,
from July 1, 1997, the law of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region will not
include the law of England. Acts of Parliament will no longer apply, the Queen will sur-
render preogative legislative authority, and, although the common law and rules of equity
are to be maintained and are listed among "laws previously in force in Hong Kong," the
courts are specifically permitted to refer to precedents in other common law jurisdictions
[Annex I, § 3]; the change of sovereignty from British to Chinese makes retention of the
"imperial" link in any form whatsoever politically unacceptable.
Id. at 1 (footnote omitted).
A primary purpose of Hong Kong's reception of English law was to set the new colony on
its path: to give it a ready-made corpus of law which could be modified by judges as neces-
sity arose and by legislators as policy demanded, a structure which was at once suited to
the mercantile requirement of the British Empire yet adapted to local circumstances. After
143 years Hong Kong no longer needs English statutes and can decide for herself what
rules of commom law and equity she wants. The imperial link with Britain is to be severed
but the legacy - a common law legal system - will be as important to the fledgling
Special Administration Region as it was to the infant Colony.
Id. at 59 (footnotes omitted).
7 DENG XIAOPING, JIANSHE You ZHONGGUO TESE DI SHEHUI ZHUYI (Building Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics) 22, 29, 30, 32, 40, 55 (1984).
8 On April 10, 1985, at the Sixth N.P.C., 3d. Sess., the N.P.C. and its Standing Committee
adopted a Decision on the Basic Law Drafting. Pursuant to the resolution, the Basic Law Drafting
Committee was formed in Beijing in mid-1985. This was followed by the formation of the Basic Law
Consultative Committee in Hong Kong towards the end of the same year. The Basic Law is sched-
uled for promulgation in 1990 and to take effect on July 1, 1997.
9 See infra notes 33-47 and accompanying text. There are many laws in the P.R.C. which on
their face apply to the whole of the P.R.C. The principal questions include: 1) which of the pre-
existing laws are to be excluded from the S.A.R.; 2) how does one go about excluding such laws; 3)
what restraints should be placed in the future on the power of the Central Government organs to
make laws for or issue directions to the S.A.R.; and 4) would there be any direct application of laws
at all, and if so, which laws.
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interface and differentiation of the two systems.10 This Article seeks to
anticipate the new jurisprudential framework within which these and
other issues will have to be met, highlighting features different from those
found in jurisprudence of a more familiar kind. The Article is heuristic
in approach" and critical realist in orientation. 2 The heuristic devices
used to facilitate the transition from political to juridical norms will be
identified so as to arrive at a better understanding of the nature and func-
tion of the norms themselves.
II. POLITICAL NORMS AND HEURISTIC NOTIONS
A. Political Norms13
A study of political norms is essential to an understanding of polit-
ical-legal thought within the P.R.C. In the P.R.C., "the moment the
political norms change, the legal system has to adjust."14 The Sino-Brit-
ish Joint Declaration itself makes explicit reference to two types of
norms. Article 3 of the Joint Declaration states the "basic policies" of
the P.R.C. regarding Hong Kong and Annex I elaborates on those poli-
cies. The term "basic policies" in the English text is in fact a de-ide-
ologized version of the phrase used in the Chinese text of the Joint
Declaration, namely 'fiben fangzhen zhengce." To appreciate the ideo-
logical content of the Chinese phraseology, it is necessary to recall that
the Chinese Communist Party ("C.C.P.") has established three types of
norms which not only govern all aspects of the party's work but also
permeate the nation's laws and institutions. The norms are classified as
follows: 1. zhengzhi luxian ("political line"); 2. fangzhen ("direction in-
dicator"); and 3. zhengce ("policy"). These party norms are almost al-
ways listed in a fixed order and the phrase used in the Joint Declaration
embraces the second and third types.1
The first type, luxian for short,1 6 expresses the political task formu-
lated by the C.C.P. and the line that must be followed to achieve defined
10 See infra notes 29, 82-84 and accompanying text.
11 See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
13 "Political norms" as used in this Article denotes all three types of party norms discussed in
this Article not merely norms of the third type. In von Senger's work the term "political norms" is
used only for norms of the third type. H. von Senger, Recent Developments in the Relations between
State and Party Norms in the People's Republic of China, in THE SCOPE OF STATE POWER IN CHINA
(S. Schram ed. 1985).
14 See, eg., Y.Y. ZHANG & S.W. WANG, TALKS ON BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF LAW 74 passim,
(2d ed. 1980) (observations as to the effect of changes in party policies on statutory law).
15 See General Principles of the Statutes of the Communist Party of China (last para.) (promul-
gated by the Party Center (dang zhongyang) in Beijing, Sept. 6, 1982.
16 For a definition of the term "luxian," see CIHAI, ZHENGZHi FALU (Political-Legal Princi-
ples) 23 (1961).
CASE W RES. J INT'L L.
objectives during a specific period. According to the prevailing political
line, which has developed since the famous Third Plenary Session of the
1 1th C.C.P. Central Committee held in December 1978 and which was
recently confirmed and reinforced by the 13th National Party Congress
of the C.C.P. held in October-November 1987, China is passing through
a period of "early socialism" (now estimated to last another sixty years) 7
in which the principal task is the four modernizations-namely, in the
sectors of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and tech-
nology. The "principal contradiction" (zhuyao maodun) between mod-
ernization and backwardness is to be resolved by the adoption of an
open-door policy under the banner of "socialism with Chinese
characteristics."' 8
The Joint Declaration, however, makes no explicit reference to this
political line. What is expressed in the body of the Joint Declaration and
its preamble is a threefold rationale: first, in the international context,
the furtherance of friendly Sino-British relations; second, in the Hong
Kong context, the maintenance of the territory's prosperity and stability;
and third, in the Chinese context, the upholding of national unity and
territorial integrity in light of historical and present realities.19 The norm
to be followed, therefore, is that of peaceful reunification while taking
into account Hong Kong's realities.
The second type of norm, fangzhen, is more than just a direction
indicator. It prescribes the course of the task to be undertaken and regu-
lates those aspects of the work which are perceived to be in dialectical
relationship. Every fangzhen presupposes or actually identifies the dia-
lectical elements, seeking to resolve "contradictions" by a struggle be-
tween opposite aspects or by balancing one aspect with another or by
establishing priorities.2" It is for this reason that a fangzhen has been
described as a "duality norm."21 Insofar as the "one country, two sys-
tems" concept is a fangzhen, a dialectical relationship between the two
systems and between different aspects within the same system is implied,
thus giving rise to "contradictions" which will have to be resolved. Du-
ality norms will form part of the new scheme of things, at least from the
perspective of communist theory and practice.
17 See 2 COLLECTIONS OF IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS SINCE THE THIRD PLENUM (1982); see
also S. China Morning Post, Nov. 3, 1987; S. China Morning Post, Nov. 4, 1987.
18 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
19 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, preamble, 3(l).
20 Mao Zedong characterized the dialectical nature of the fangzhen "[Il]et a hundred flowers
bloom"-in terms of the supposed contradiction between "let bloom" (fang) and "rein in" (shou). 5
SELECTED WORKS OF MAO ZEDONG 432 (1954). Other examples are the 8-characterfangzhen (bazi
fangzhen) published by the CCP Party Center in 1979 which provided guidelines for the Sixth Five-
Year Plan in 1981-85. For an analysis of different types offangzhen, see H. von Senger, supra note
13.
21 The term "polaritatsnorm" was coined by von Senger. H. von Senger, supra note 13, at 177.
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The third type of norm, zhengce (policy), is the most concrete of the
three and refers to the actual measures and procedures laid down by the
C.C.P. to realize its political objectives. By combining fangzhen with
zhengce in a single phrase (prefaced by the adjectivefiben meaning basic),
the P.R.C. government is revealing in the Joint Declaration the tip of an
ideological edifice that lies largely unseen and beneath the Sino-British
accord. The following message, however, is carried in that single phrase,
jiben fangzhen zhengce: 1. the implementation of the declared policies is
a matter involving the norms laid down by the C.C.P.; 2. these basic
norms had already been established unilaterally as a matter of internal
policy before they were made the subject of the Sino-British accord; 2
and 3. the policies are directed to the resolution of perceived contradic-
tions between aspects of things in dialectical relationship in accordance
with Chinese-Marxist analysis.
The reference in the Joint Declaration to "the history of Hong Kong
and its realities"23 reflects the formula used in article 31 of the P.R.C.
Constitution mandating the establishment of S.A.R.s in light of "specific
conditions."24 The setting up of any S.A.R. is, in Chinese communist
parlance, an instance of "seeking truth from facts" (shishi qiushi) in line
with "objective laws" (keguan guilu)25 which are supposed to be inherent
in historical and present realities. The theoretical P.R.C. journal Hongqi
(Red Flag) has provided the following elaboration:
The implementation of the concept of "one country, two systems"
and the adopting of special policies towards Hong Kong is not an expe-
dient measure, but a major strategic policy decision, which has gradu-
ally taken shape since the restoration of the ideological line of seeking
truth from facts at the 3d Plenary Session of the 1 lth CPC [referred to
in text as C.C.P.] Central Committee and in the process of the CPC
Central Committee considering the problems of solving the Taiwan
and Hong Kong issues to achieve the reunification of the motherland
on the basis of the attitude of taking account of historical facts and
respecting reality. Concerning Hong Kong, this concept starts from
the basic principle that when our country resumes sovereignty over
Hong Kong, it should at the same time maintain Hong Kong's long-
term stability and prosperity. This principle conforms to the funda-
mental interests of the people of the whole country, including Hong
22 See Government Work Report, 2d Sess., 6th N.P.C., (delivered by Chinese Premier Zhao
Ziyang at the opening of the session on May 15, 1987).
23 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(1).
24 X!ANFA (Constitution) art. 31 (People's Republic of China) [hereinafter P.R.C. CONST.].
This Constitution, adopted in 1982, is the P.R.C.'s fourth (or fifth constitution if the Common Pro-
gram is counted). The three previous P.R.C. Constitutions were adopted in 1954, 1975, and 1978
respectively.
25 P. Liu, Zhengce Doubian Xi (Analysis of Policies Changing All the Time), Guangming
Ribao, Mar. 28, 1981.
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Kong compatriots, and also makes allowance for the interests of Great
Britain and other parties....
... At the same time, a stable and prosperous Hong Kong also
plays an important supplementary role in the four modernizations of
the motherland.... Utilizing Hong Kong's special position and condi-
tions will facilitate drawing in funds and introducing advanced tech-
nology and administrative and managerial experience for us and
facilitate the smooth implementation of the policy of "enlivening the
economy at home and opening to the external world." On the other
hand, the development of the economic infrastructure in our country's
interior will provide more abundant resources and a broader market
for Hong Kong.26
The pragmatism is clear. As regards the dialectics, the following
translated passages taken from a P.R.C. scholar's analysis of the philo-
sophical basis of "one country, two systems" 27 typify the efforts made by
P.R.C. theoreticians to justify the concept in terms of communist
ideology.
Some people wonder whether permitting Hong Kong, after its re-
turn, to retain its capitalist system will not affect China's socialist es-
sence. The question must be concretely analyzed according to
materialist dialectics. As Hong Kong's capitalism and the mainland's
materialist socialism are two basically opposits [sic] systems, when in-
tegrated into one country, is it possible for them not to conflict with
each other? Undeniably, Hong Kong's capitalism cannot but affect the
mainland's socialism, and refusing to admit this point is incompatible
with reality. However, we must also realize that China's main part is
socialism.... In a unified large socialist country, the presence of the
capitalist system in individual areas will not change China's socialist
essence.... In their mutual influence, the mainland's socialist influ-
ence on Hon [sic] Kong will play the principal and decisive role....
The concept of "one country, two systems" recognizes both the
abuses of capitalism and its positive role in a certain historical stage,
considers both the history of Honk [sic] Kong and its current state,
uphold[s] the socialist principles, the unity of the motherland, the in-
26 A Reliable Guarantee for Hong Kong's Long-Term Stability and Prosperity, HONGQI, Oct.
21, 1984, at 21-22, reprinted in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE--CHINA REPORT
[hereinafter FBIS], Dec. 10, 1984, at 34. See also J.Q. Yan, The Scientific Meaning and Characteris-
tics of "One Country, Two Systems", HONGQI, Mar. 16, 1985, at 18-20, reprinted in FBIS, June 6,
1985, at 26.
It is understood that Hongqi (which has the reputation of being ultra-conservative) has been
given a three-month grace period by the Chinese Communists to wind up its operations.
27 H.Z. Fan, An Analysis of the Philosophical Basis of "One Country, Two Systems," SHANXI
DAXUE XUEBAO (Journal of Shanxi University-Philosophy and Social Science), July 1985, at 22-
25, reprinted in FBIS, Jan. 24, 1986, at 28.
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terests of the state and the people, and the adherence of China's main
part to socialism, while advocating the flexibility of seeking truth from
facts, and, on the basis of following the socialist principles, gives atten-
tion to Hong Kong's special conditions and the interests of all sides,
and permits it to preserve capitalism for an extended period and re-
main independent to a certain extent. The concept is the result of ad-
hering to the ideological line of seeking truth from facts, starting from
reality, linking theory with practice and making a concrete analysis of
a concrete issue and a product of searching, under the ideological gui-
dance of materialist dialectics, for commonality between opposites.
In short, pragmatism in the P.R.C. has to be ideologically pure and
perfectly in line with the political norms. Any flexibility which exists has
to be sought within those norms, but to the extent that some of those
norms are "direction indicators" they do have a measure of elasticity and
a heuristic function.
B. Heuristic Notions
The Chinese communists have through the United Front Work De-
partment of the C.C.P. Central Committee and the China United Front
Theory Research Association perfected the art of reducing the most com-
plex and sometimes contradictory goals to simple yet powerfully evoca-
tive four-character propositions. The concept of "one country, two
systems" began its life as an eight-character proposition (yige guojia,
liangge zhidu) but was quickly abbreviated to four characters (yiguo
liangzhi). Three other four-character propositions lie at the heart of the
Sino-British accord, namely "Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong"
(gangren zhigang), "High Degree of Autonomy" (gaodu zizhi) and "No
Change in Systems" (zhidu bubian). Each of these four propositions is
indeterminate and open to manipulation; each is capable of becoming
more determinate and is currently being manipulated. Each proposition
provides clues and points the way to a realization of goals and is a chal-
lenge to human ingenuity. In short, they make excellent slogans and also
possess the characteristics of heuristic notions employed in science,
mathematics and education. 28
28 See B. LONERGAN, INSIGHT, A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1958). In this monu-
mental work, classical and statistical methods of arriving at insights, including the use of heuristic
notions and structures, are extensively explored. A heuristic notion or device, as used in this Article,
has two salient aspects: 1) it points to that which has yet to be discovered and 2) it facilitates discov-
ery by providing an apt symbol or clue or sets of symbols or clues whereby the necessary operations,
can be performed and the general shape and content of what is intended may be anticipated. For
example, "let the unknown be X" is the heuristic device by which algebra is made possible. "Do
good and avoid evil" is a heuristic norm by which morality can have its point of departure. The
notion of "being" is the key heuristic notion in metaphysics whereby what is to be known by intelli-
gent grasp and reasonable affirmation is anticipated. The concept of "nature" is a key heuristic
notion in modem science whereby what is yet unknown is designated, objectivized and made the
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Each of the four propositions can and has in fact been transformed
into a principle of political action: they are in the nature of fangzhen
tending towards zhengce. In the current debate over issues which have
arisen during the drafting of the Basic Law, the "one country" compo-
nent of the first proposition is often coupled with the "sovereignty" con-
cept to protect the power of the center from being dispersed. The "two
systems" component is regularly employed, along with the second and
third propositions ("Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong" and "High
Degree of Autonomy"), to prevent the future Hong Kong S.A.R. system
from being completely absorbed by the P.R.C. socialist body politic. Fi-
nally, the fourth proposition, "No Change in Systems," is increasingly
invoked to guard against fundamental changes in the status quo of Hong
Kong.
How these tensions between "centrality" and "regional autonomy"
are eventually resolved in the Basic Law is likely to have significant bear-
ing on the shape and content of the new jurisprudence. For instance, if
the interpretation of the Basic Law for the Hong Kong S.A.R. were al-
lowed to rest with a political organ of the P.R.C. central government
rather than with a judicial organ of the S.A.R., the common law system
within the S.A.R. would be seriously undermined. The idea of law as an
autonomous discipline would be at risk and might in time be displaced by
political-legal or non-juridical concepts and practices. Again, if the
P.R.C.'s laws (even if restricted to those of a certain kind) were given
direct and automatic effect in the S.A.R., the autonomy of the S.A.R.
system as a whole and the status and function of the Basic Law itself
would likewise be jeopardized. It is the author's submission that the
"one country, two systems" concept will not stand any chance of success
unless the two systems are "hived off" from each other at various strate-
gic points and an interface provided at other points where the systems
must meet.
It is the S.A.R. which provides the forum for system differentiation
to take place and constitutes the single most important device in the pres-
ent context to facilitate the transition from political to juridical norms.
Article 31 of the P.R.C. Constitution which is contained in the "General
Principles" chapter of the constitution provides as follows: "The state
may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The sys-
tems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed
by laws enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of specific
conditions."29
subject of scientific inquiry. The concept of natural law, in the author's view, has essentially a heu-
ristic function, as has the concept of "objective laws" referred to in this Article.
29 The original draft of this article (then numbered 30) was materially different. It provided:
"The state may, where necessary, establish special administrative regions. The rules and regulations
Vol. 20:99
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Article 31 does not define what an S.A.R. is nor does it tell us what
systems may be instituted there. Determination of the systems is left to
the N.P.C. in light of specific conditions. In common with other heuris-
tic devices, however, the S.A.R. concept carries clues from which the
general nature of what is intended may be anticipated. The clues are: 1)
that an S.A.R. is something "special," i.e., an exception from the general
system; 30 2) that insofar as it comprises, "a system or systems" it is essen-
tially different from other administrative divisions of the P.R.C. which
are part of the socialist system; 3) that the S.A.R. system or systems will
exist by virtue of a special law or laws to be passed by the N.P.C. thereby
signifying a direct relationship with central government organs and inde-
pendence from provincial authorities and at the same time distinguishing
such measures from, for example, the protection of various rights of mi-
nority nationalities under article 4 of the constitution; 31 4) that such a
special law or laws will be tailored to the specific realities which have
made it necessary for an S.A.R. to be established in the first place--"ne-
cessity" being interpreted in terms of the P.R.C.'s exigencies and the pre-
vailing political norms; and 5) that an S.A.R. is therefore not a
permanent but only a transitional reality, a means towards the eventual
realization of national goals. It must be emphasized, however, that an
S.A.R. is not just an economic unit distinct from the rest of the country.
It is a localized political-legal entity and a socio-economic reality differ-
entiated from the general socialist system but forming part of a unitary
state. This does not imply that it will ever be allowed by the central
government to become a competing political entity in relation to the gen-
eral system. On the contrary, it implies that the two systems are not
equal since the basic norm32 of the new order will be located within the
in force in special administrative regions shall be stipulated by law in the light of specific condi-
tions." No mention was made of "system or systems" or to laws enacted by the N.P.C.
30 An S.A.R. is fundamentally different from an S.E.Z. ("Special Economic Zone") such as
Shenzhen immediately north of the Hong Kong border with the P.R.C. S.E.Z.s have no special
constitutional status and are part of the centrally planned economy of the P.R.C.
31 The P.R.C. is a unitary state but a multi-national country with 55 minority nationality
groups. There are 116 national autonomous areas (5 autonomous regions, 31 autonomous prefec-
tures and 80 autonomous counties). In at least three major aspects, however, regional autonomy of
these areas is severely circumscribed: (1) no policies can be adopted which are contrary to the state
constitution and laws, the organs of every national autonomous area being under an express duty to
ensure that the P.R.C. constitution and P.R.C. laws are observed; (2) the four "cardinal principles"
or "insistences" (jianchi) enshrined in the Constitution, (namely following "the socialist path," "the
leadership of C.C.P.," adherence to "the people's democratic dictatorship," and to "Marxist-Lenin-
ism and Mao Zedong thought"), have to be observed; and, (3) the policies to be adopted within the
autonomous regions are subject to the centrally planned socialist economy.
32 The author prefers the term "basic norm" to "grundnorm," the Kelsenian term. The basic
norm that grounds other legal norms is a key concept in Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law. The
author does not, however, share the philosophical presuppositions of Kelsen's "grundnorm."
For Kelsen, law is a binding norm, and nothing more: it has no ethical or moral content so
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P.R.C.'s socialist system which article I of the P.R.C. Constitution un-
compromisingly declares to be "the basic system of the People's Republic
of China."
III. BASIC LAW ENIGMAS
The Joint Declaration, in Annex I, provides that "the laws of the
Hong Kong Special Aadministrative Region shall be the Basic Law, and
the laws previously in force in Hong Kong and laws enacted by the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region legislature.""3 On the face of this
provision, a self-contained corpus of law is contemplated for the Hong
Kong S.A.R. since no mention is made of any central government legisla-
tion other than the Basic Law itself applying in Hong Kong. Therefore,
it appears that it will generally be unnecessary for a Hong Kong S.A.R.
court faced with an issue of Hong Kong domestic law to go outside the
"four corners" of the Basic Law and interpret or apply the P.R.C. Con-
stitution or other central government legislation. This matter, however,
is not as simple as it sounds.
The Basic Law for the Hong Kong S.A.R. will expressly exclude the
socialist system and socialist policies from an important and strategic
corner of China for fifty years after 1997, and by implication will also
exclude those provisions in the P.R.C. Constitution which either impose
or presuppose a socialist system. The basic conundrum is how such a
law can exclude provisions in the very Constitution under which it is
promulgated without self-contradiction and without running the risk of
becoming a bastard child. After all, the nation is solemnly enjoined to
take the mother Constitution as "the basic norm of conduct"34 and to
"uphold the uniformity and dignity of the Constitution,"3 " declaring that
''no law or administrative or local rules and regulations shall contravene
the Constitution." 36
The legal realist will say that no real problem exists since the child
will be deemed perfectly legitimate in the P.R.C. as long as its father, the
C.C.P., recognizes it as such: in Chinese communist theory, law is party
far as the lawyer is concerned, its validity derives purely causally from the fact that it is
enacted with the power of the state behind it. The positivist rechtsstaat appeared to Kelsen
to be drawing a distinction in favor of the latter between a state based on force and a state
based on law. For Kelsen the two are identical. The state is the sum total of laws, and
laws are the state in action, the legal order. Every state, therefore, which has a legal order
is of necessity a rechtsstaat, a state based on law.
L. SCHAPIRO, RUSSIAN STUDIES, 33-34 (1986).
33 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex I, § II.
34 P.R.C. CONST. preamble (last para.).
35 Id.
36 Id. art. 5.
Vol. 20:99
TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF A THIRD KIND
policy made perfect in legal form.37 In other words, while the Constitu-
tion may on paper be the jurisprudential basic norm, it is the political
norms which govern both its interpretation and application. The Stand-
ing Committee of the N.P.C. is, subject to the N.P.C.'s overiiding pow-
ers,38 the highest organ of constitutional interpretation and application in
the P.R.C. and will act in accordance with the political norms. There-
fore, the political and jurisprudential basic norms will, under this view,
inevitably travel in tandem so long as the Party is not separated from the
State.39
This enigma tends to take on an entirely different complexion when
seen from the perspective of the Hong Kong system. While the Hong
Kong S.A.R. courts will not be able to question the legitimacy or consti-
tutionality of the Basic Law upon which their own legitimacy and very
existence will depend, they may in the course of adjudication of disputes
be called upon to decide what other provisions of the P.R.C. Constitution
(apart from article 31) will apply to the S.A.R. The problem is linked
with the broader and equally vexed issue of the application of P.R.C.
laws to the S.A.R. The P.R.C. Nationality Law is often cited as an ex-
ample of a Chinese law which could apply directly to the S.A.R.
Another enigma arises from the fact that while the Hong Kong
S.A.R. will be vested with the final power of adjudication, the Standing
Committee of the N.P.C. will, unless the P.R.C. Constitution is
amended, have power to interpret the Basic Law, notwithstanding the
fact that the Joint Declaration fully recognizes the need to keep the Hong
Kong judicial system separate from that of the Chinese mainland.4 The
Supreme People's Court will not be part of the Hong Kong S.A.R.'s sys-
37 See A. Chen, China's Developing Legal System, 13 HONG KONG L.J. 291, 299-301 (1983).
38 P.R.C. CONST. art. 67. Under article 62 of the P.R.C. Constitution, the N.P.C. has power
"to alter or annul inappropriate decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress." Id. art. 62.
39 Recent developments in the P.R.C. have generally tended to raise the status of both the
Constitution (declared in the preamble of the Joint Declaration to be "the fundamental law of the
state" and to have "supreme legal authority") and of statutory law. However, in the P.R.C. statu-
tory law "does not serve the function of an autonomous force for shaping the social order" rather
"as a vehicle for making casuistic elaborations to Party norms and their translation into guiding
principles which are compulsory for all citizens of the P.R.C ... " and a "substantial change in the
paramount importance of the Party norms is not apparent at present since the contemplated with-
drawal of the Party from the domain of executive work, especially with renewed stress on the task of
the supervision and implementation of Party norms .. " H. von Senger, supra note 13, at 207. It
should nevertheless be mentioned that the C.C.P. in 1982 amended its constitution to insert a provi-
sion for the first time in its history to the effect that the Party (and not just its members, as was
previously the case) would be subject to the P.R.C. Constitution and state laws. "No organization or
individual may enjoy the privilege of being above the Constitution and the laws." P.R.C. CONST.
art. 5.
40 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(3).
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tem of courts. Hong Kong will have its own Court of Final Appeal." l
Appeals to the Judicial Committee of Privy Council will be abolished but
the new Court of Final Appeal will be empowered to invite judges from
common law jurisdictions to sit in particular cases.42 The Joint Declara-
tion expressly declares that precedents in other common law jurisdictions
may be referred to by the Hong Kong S.A.R. courts. It leaves undefined,
however, the courts' jurisdiction and says nothing about who will inter-
pret the Basic Law and who will decide whether a particular law of the
Hong Kong legislature contravenes the Basic Law. There is at present
no special constitutional court on either side of the border.
A third enigma, or set of enigmas, arises from the duality of the
Basic Law insofar as it is simultaneously a law of the P.R.C.-therefore a
product of socialist legality-and the foundational law of the Hong Kong
S.A.R.-thus an instrument whereby the common law, its procedures
and institutions, are preserved. The Basic Law will have to be structured
so as to be able to link as well as separate features from both systems thus
incorporating concepts from each without confusing the two systems or
undermining the "one country." Difficulties in drafting arise, however,
when the same word or phrase conveys one meaning on the Chinese
mainland and has another vastly different connotation in Hong Kong-
e.g., freedom in accordance with law, judicial independence, accountabil-
ity, sovereignty and autonomy.43 While there are common objectives
which also need to be stressed, wide divergences exist between the two
legal systems with respect to form and content, history and tradition,
method and procedure, and theory and practice. 4 For example, the
common law heritage has given Hong Kong not just a neat set of rules
but an attitude of mind, not mere rules of action but also ways of acting,4
not just "Rule by law" but "the Rule of Law." It is these attitudes and
forms of conduct as well as the spirit of the Rule of Law that are particu-
larly difficult to translate into legal norms, especially in a context where
radically different principles and attitudes are espoused by the incoming
sovereign authority.
41 Id. Annex I, § III.
42 Id.
43 Even within the same system of norms there are differences of perception. How high, for
example, will "the high degree of autonomy" promised for Hong Kong turn out to be? How closely
will it approach the "full measure of self government" as understood by the United Nations in
relation to the development of non-self governing territories towards self-rule? See, L. Sohn, Models
of Autonomy within the United Nations Framework, in MODELS OF AUTONOMY 9-22 (Y. Dinstein
ed. 1981).
44 See generally The Migration of the Common Law, 76 LAW Q. REV. 39 (reprint of introduc-
tory talks aired by the B.B.C. Overseas Service).
45 G. Bartholomew, The Singapore Legal System, in SINGAPORE: SOCIETY IN TRANSITION
100-02 (R. Hassan ed. 1976); D. Sugarman, Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the Making
of the Textbook Tradition, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 26-27 (W. Twining ed. 1986).
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The problem is complicated by the fact that the Basic Law is being
drafted and will be promulgated in Chinese (although an "official" ver-
sion in English is mooted), whereas English remains the language of the
common law and, prior to the introduction of bilingual legislation in
Hong Kong, the sole language of legislation in Hong Kong.46 Further-
more, in the P.R.C. there are three types of legal interpretation: legisla-
tive, executive and judicial. 7 In the Hong Kong S.A.R. system there
will only be one type, namely, judicial. It remains to be seen what canons
of interpretation will develop when the common law is placed in such an
uncommon setting. The interaction between the two systems is apt to
produce a jurisprudence of a new and unusual kind.
IV. SOLVING THE ENIGMAS: A FUNCTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
In the course of attempting to solve these and other enigmas,48 the
foundations of a new jurisprudence will be laid. Such a jurisprudence, to
be successful, must take as its point of departure the existing realities
sought to be embraced by the concept of "one country, two systems." 49
To that extent, therefore, it is at least initially likely to be a purely func-
tional jurisprudence since it is derived from the very pragmatism that it
must serve in order to survive. Nevertheless, it is a jurisprudence that is
unlikely to have a future unless it is willing to carry the dynamism and
imaginative thrust contained in "one country, two systems" to the outer
limits of what is permissible. In the process, a new vocabulary and a new
methodology will have to be developed so as to achieve the necessary
breakthrough in the face of numerous difficulties caused by a clash of
systems.5 °
46 The English text of the first bilingual piece of legislation, the Weights and Measures Ordi-
nance, was enacted in Hong Kong in Aug. 1987. The Chinese text, equally authentic, is expected
this year.
Annex I, section I of the Joint Declaration provides that "in addition to Chinese, English may
be used in organs of government and in the courts in the Hong Kong Special Administration Re-
gion." The Hong Kong Additional Instructions 1986 (L.N. 20386, 128 H.K. GOVERNMENT GA-
ZETrrE No. 34, Legal Supp. 2) which came into effect on August 22, 1986 amended the Hong Kong
Royal Instructions 1917 to 1985 to allow laws to be enacted in English or Chinese, thus paving the
way for bilingual legislation. The Official Languages Ordinance and the Interpretation and General
Clauses Ordinance have since been amended to provide the necessary legal framework for bilingual
Legislation and to lay down rules for resolving conflict between texts. The Vienna Convention ap-
proach to interpretation of multilingual treaties (article 33) has been adopted: the rule is to ascertain
"the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purposes of the ordi-
nance." See F. Cheung, Bilingual Statute Law in Hong Kong (unpublished manuscript presented at
the Conference on the Common Law in Asia, Dec. 15-17, 1985, University of Hong Kong).
47 See Chang Hsin, The Power of Interpretation of the Basic Law for Hong Kong as Viewed from
the Way of Interpretation of Chinese Law, Ming Pao, Feb. 28, 1985, at 17.
48 See supra part III.
49 See supra part II.
50 See supra part III. Examples of other difficulties which are being tackled or which will have
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Nothing illustrates this better than the issue of constitutional judi-
cial review which involves, among other things, the problem of the power
of interpretation of the Basic Law and its relationship with the power of
final adjudication to be vested in the S.A.R. courts.51 One response to
the problem, a response that comes from a mentality more suited to "one
country" than to "two systems," is to insist that the Standing Committee
of the N.P.C. shall retain not merely nominal but real and plenary power
of interpretation of all aspects of the Basic Law, as well as full power to
declare any S.A.R. law invalid on the grounds that it is contradictory to
the Basic Law or not in accordance with established legal procedures (as
interpreted by the Standing Committee).52 A radically different re-
sponse, coming from a mentality more suited to "two systems" than "one
country," is to insist that the Hong Kong S.A.R. courts alone shall have
the power of interpretation. 3
Both types of responses ignore the fact that we are faced with an
unprecedented and unique jurisprudential problem: the coming together
under one roof, yet remaining in many respects distinct, not just two sys-
tems of law, civil law and common law, but also substantial factors of a
third, namely, socialist law. In inspiration and structure, this socialist
law used to follow faithfully the Russian model but now is declared by
the modem Chinese leadership to have acquired Chinese characteris-
tics.5 4 Socialist legality with a Chinese face includes, as one of its latest
features, two systems within one country. 55 More concretely, in the con-
text of the interpretation of the Basic Law, there are at least three sets of
fundamental differences between the two systems which must be resolved
or accommodated. The first set of differences concerns the P.R.C.'s cen-
to be addressed include: the question of "residual powers"; the status of central government agencies
and instrumentalities in the S.A.R.; the position of the C.C.P. in the S.A.R. in the light of its leader-
ship role and the doctrine of "democratic centralism" under the P.R.C. Constitution; and the
problems associated with extradition, internal renvoi, etc.
51 See supra part III. See also Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3.
52 The latest preparatory draft of the Basic Law contains a number of draft articles and various
alternative proposals relevant to this issue. See COLLECTION OF DRAFT ARTICLES OF THE VARIOUS
CHAPTERS PREPARED BY THE SUBGROUPS OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE ch. 9 (The Interpreta-
tion and Amendment of the Basic Law of the HKSAR) [hereinafter COLLECTION OF DRAFT ARTI-
CLES] (compiled by the Secretariat of the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law, Dec. 1987)
(translated by the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law, Jan. 5, 1988). See
also id. art. 16 (within ch. 2, The Relationship between the Central Government and the HKSAR).
53 This proposal is sometimes coupled with the suggestion that since it is necessary to have a
national as distinguished from a regional tribunal to interpret the Basic Law, that task should be
assumed not by a political body, such as the Standing Committee of the N.P.C., but rather by a
specially formed constitutional court whose members are drawn equally from both systems and
whose jurisdiction should be so circumscribed as not to affect the power of final adjudication vested
in the S.A.R. See infra.
54 See supra part II; infra part V.
55 Id.
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tralized system of legislative interpretation56 as contrasted with Hong
Kong's decentralized system of judicial interpretation. These differences
make the doctrine of constitutional judicial review quite alien to the
P.R.C. system but perfectly meaningful and absolutely essential within
the Hong Kong system. The second set of differences concerns the essen-
tially interpretivist stance 7 of the Hong Kong judicial system which
tends to see its role as a limited one of interpreting the law according to
its original intent and applying it free from political and other external
considerations. This is in stark contrast with the essentially non-inter-
pretivist position58 adopted by the P.R.C. system which tends to see law
as "a weapon" of political norms and the P.R.C. Constitution itself as
fundamentally political. The third set of differences concern the method
of review, more particularly the "review incidenter" system of the Hong
Kong courts which, like the courts in many other common law jurisdic-
tions, 9 reviews legislation generally only in the course of adjudication of
disputes in ordinary cases brought before them. This is to be contrasted
with a "review principaliter" system practiced in some countries' where
a constitutional issue is presented as a principal issue independent of any
actual case and usually by governmental organizations. The P.R.C. sys-
tem has characteristics of review principaliter, but this function is per-
formed within a system of legislative interpretation and not "judicial"
review as we would understand it.
The interpretivist stance of the Hong Kong system is likely to be
carried over to the S.A.R. system mainly because the Joint Declaration is
essentially "preservationist" in declared intention in relation to Hong
Kong's presently existing socio-economic systems and life style and its
56 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
57 This Article does not attempt to explain all the nuances of an "interpretivist" or "original
intent" posture. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986). American constitutional experience has
amply demonstrated the tension that can develop between an approach that professes to look to the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution and the non-interpretivist approach of considering "[w]hat
... the words of the text mean in our time [on the supposed basis that] what the constitutional
fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be their measure to the vision of our time."
Speech of Associate Justice Brennan, Oct. 1985. The Basic Law, however, will be sui generis and
will, in many of its essential provisions, be professedly preservationist in character.
58 See The Use of the Legal Weapon, CHINA NEWS ANALYSIS, June 18, 1984, at 1 (no. 1263).
59 Examples include the United States, Canada, and Australia although such a system does not
necessarily exclude all advisory opinions.
60 This is true in a few continental systems, such as Austria and Italy, although recent develop-
ments tend to favor a mixed system. See M. CAPPELLOTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPO-
RARY WORLD (1971). See also M. Davis, The HKSAR Basic Law and the Concept of
Constitutional Judicial Review (paper presented at the Conference on Constitutional Law and Basic
Laws, Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 1986, Chinese University of Hong Kong).
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judicial system and laws which are to remain "basically unchanged. 61
There is thus a set of historical and empirical reference points likely to
shape the future jurisprudence.6 2 One of the greatest challenges that
faces Hong Kong is how to ensure that the best features of the present
system will be preserved and strengthened in the face of great impending
political change and yet retain the flexibility needed to cope with a rap-
idly changing milieu. The Joint Declaration is not, of course, entirely
preservationist. The reformist thrust in the Joint Declaration, which
must also be carried over to the Basic Law, lies precisely in the political
changes mandated as part of the transfer of governance and also in both
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to
Hong Kong which the Joint Declaration says "shall remain in force."6 3
Constitutional review, whether of the legislative or judicial variety
or a combination of both, is therefore likely to focus upon and bring to
the forefront two crucial topics among others of perennial concern. The
first is the manner and degree of the protection of human rights and
freedoms and of Hong Kong's "life style" and the values that underpin
the Hong Kong legal system.' The second is the scope of the S.A.R.'s
autonomy not only in structural but also in operational terms. The inter-
national dimensions of the S.A.R.'s autonomy, such as the legal status of
"Hong Kong, China," which affects its capacity to handle external trad-
ing relations and its standing in world markets, will also have to be ad-
dressed by the new jurisprudence.65
It is possible from the foregoing analysis66 to ascertain the principal
61 See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(3).
62 These reference points are likely to affect not only the drafting of the Basic Law but also the
canons of interpretation. For example, the constitutional protection of human rights in S.A.R. is
presently sought to be achieved by reference (1) to the rights and freedoms presently enjoyed under
or in accordance with law, (2) the two international covenants on civil and political rights as cur-
rently applied to Hong Kong, and (3) additional rights conferred by the Basic Law. In interpreting
what these rights and freedoms are, therefore, the Hong Kong S.A.R. courts should in principle be
able to establish presumptive rules of interpretation designed to secure a measure of rights and free-
doms no less than the fundamental rights and freedoms "previously" enjoyed. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
63 See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex I, § XIII.
64 "Life-style" is a product of many factors, including the restraint that the authorities are
expected to exercise in using the legal powers they have if the full measure of freedom under the law
is to be preserved.
65 The relevant issues include: the legal status of the Joint Declaration; the capacity of the
Hong Kong S.A.R. under the name of "Hong Kong, China" to conduct its own relations and agree-
ments with other regions and international organizations; its position in relation to multilateral
agreements, such as GATT, by virtue of its ability to meet the requirements for a "customs terri-
tory"; and the status of the various memoranda to the Joint Declaration in light of art. 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
66 See supra notes 48-65 and accompanying text.
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elements of a solution to the enigma of interpretation and indeed to other
enigmas caused by a clash of the two systems. These elements are:
1. A "sovereignty norm"6 7 which assigns responsibility to the central
government for defense and foreign affairs (as distinguished from ex-
ternal commercial and other affairs delegated to the S.A.R.). The
sovereignty norm thus forms the baseline for any solution. This
means, for example, that a central organ, here the Standing Commit-
tee of the N.P.C., must retain jurisdiction to interpret the Basic Law
in relation to-foreign affairs and defense. This jurisdiction should be
carefully circumscribed and should not jeopardize the autonomy of
S.A.R. organs to deal with external affairs or the S.A.R. courts'
power to decide if a particular act is or is not an "act of state."6
2. An "autonomy norm"69 which assigns to the S.A.R. as part of its
high degree of autonomy the capacity to effectively exercise the final
power of adjudication which will be given to the courts by the Basic
Law. The autonomy norm should appropriate not only a sufficiently
wide jurisdiction for the S.A.R. courts but also protect their indepen-
dence.70 The norm will carry with it mechanisms for hiving off"' an
S.A.R. system from other systems operating in the mainland to the
extent necessary to protect its legitimate autonomy. The power of
final adjudication is itself an examplepar excellence of such a mecha-
nism, but it has to be fortified by other rules such as: 1) a rule to the
effect that no decision of the Standing Committee of the N.P.C. shall
disturb the results of cases finally adjudicated by the S.A.R. courts;72
and 2) a rule to the effect that no law of the P.R.C. shall apply to the
S.A.R., except the Basic Law or laws expressly made applicable to
the S.A.R. through a narrowly defined and closely guarded "win-
dow"7 3 in the Basic Law itself. The Basic Law, however, will have
to acknowledge that there are provisions in the P.R.C. Constitution
(e.g., article 31 of the Constitution) whose effect would have to be
recognized if the Basic Law is to have validity or if territorial integ-
rity is, among other things, to be preserved.74
3. A "preservationist norm"75 which seeks to preserve as far as possible
the essentials of the Hong Kong S.A.R.'s common law system in-
67 See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(2).
68 See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
69 See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(3).
70 See id. Annex I, § 3.
71 See supra part II.
72 See COLLECTION OF DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 52, ch. 9.
73 See id. art. 17 (ch. 2).
74 Id. art. 17(2).
75 The existing systems singled out for preservation by the Joint Declaration include not only
the S.A.R.'s judicial and socio-economic systems but also, specifically, its monetary, shipping, avia-
tion, financial and other systems, including freedom from exchange control.
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.eluding the doctrine of precedent and rules of interpretation. The
system sought to be preserved is a dynamic one and, therefore, is
always on the move and open to reform. The "preservationist norm"
seeks to draw the line between what strengthens, refines or purifies
the system as we know it and what subverts or alters it fundamen-
tally beyond those changes necessitated by the new political order
and the changeover to constitutionalism.76 Thus, in the context of
constitutional judicial review, the Hong Kong S.A.R. courts should
at the very least retain their existing jurisdiction to interpret all laws,
including constitutional instruments, in the course of adjudication of
disputes (review incidenter). Their review jurisdiction, of course, is
not restricted to laws but also extends to governmental acts, 78 subject
to the existing restrictions which distinguish between "acts of
state"7 9 and "facts of state."80 With respect to the former, the courts
have jurisdiction to decide whether a particular act belongs to the
category of "acts of state," '81 but with respect to "facts of state" (e.g.,
whether a state of war exists), the courts look to a certification of the
fact from the appropriate government official or department.82
4. A system interface which creates a meeting ground between the two
systems without destroying the identity of either. One option is the
creation of a Special Basic Law Advisory Committee of Jurists83
drawn equally from both systems whose primary task would be to
advise the Standing Committee of the N.P.C. on the classification of
issues,84 i.e., whether a particular issue pertains to foreign affairs or
defense or the allocation of power between central government or-
gans and the S.A.R. or, on the contrary, involves purely an internal
S.A.R. matter and therefore should be outside the purview of the
Standing Committee or other central government organs.85
76 Constitutionalism involves, among other things, the translation of "residual" freedoms
under the common law into substantive rights and the securing of legitimate expectations.
77 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
78 Judicial review is, of course, much wider than constitutional judicial review.




83 This is a proposal mooted by the Special Group on Law of the Basic Law Consultative
Committee. It envisages a Committee of Jurists forming a distinct organ within a larger "Basic Law
Advisory Committee." See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. The Jurists will deal with
questions of legal classification while the larger Committtee will deal with political issues such as
proposals for amendment of the Basic Law, application of specific P.R.C. legislation, etc.
84 The power of final adjudication vested in the S.A.R. courts will, of course, include a power
of classification of issues.
85 See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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5. A set of directive principles86 designed to induce the birth and accel-
erate the growth of what in the Hong Kong system would be de-
scribed as "principal conventions.""7 An example is a rule to the
effect that the Standing Committee, while in a strict legal sense re-
taining all the powers given to it by the P.R.C. Constitution, would
accept the advice of the Basic Law Advisory Committee on the legal
classification of issues and refrain from exercising power to interpret
the Basic Law or otherwise to declare invalid any S.A.R. legislation
not classified as a matter of foreign affairs, defense or S.A.R. govern-
ment relations with the central government.88 These restraints
would preferably be built into the Basic Law by way of justiciable
rules of law. But pending such amendments as may be needed to the
P.R.C. Constitution, directive principles may well be the best practi-
cal means of achieving the desired results, especially bearing in mind
that even under the Hong Kong system-which maintains a strong
tradition of the Rule of Law-the smooth working of the system de-
pends not merely on strict legal rights but also on legitimate expecta-
tions habitually upheld as a matter of convention and practice.89
The development of constitutionalism9" involves, among other
things, effective translation of legitimate expectations into legal rights
and the implementation of those rights in real life. However, the use of
directive principles-whether in the limited context and special sense de-
scribed above or in the larger field of realization of national goals and the
development of economic, cultural and social rights of the people9 -- is
something which forms part of a continuing process aimed at securing
human rights, freedom and a better life for all. Nevertheless, where it is
practicable to go beyond directive principles to a more secure system of
protection of rights and freedom, we should not be satisified with a state-
ment of principles which may be rich in inspirational content but bank-
rupt of legal effect. In the novel setting of "one country, two systems"
where credibility has yet to be fully established, it is important that we
use in our choice of options what may be conveniently referred to as
"credibility norms."92 A credibility norm is first and foremost a principle
of action which seeks to make good that which is perceived to be deficient
in credibility and, secondly, a principle of selection which seeks out
among available options that which is perceived to be the most credible
86 These directive principles have a different function than the directive principles contained in
the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
87 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 819 (4th ed. 1974).
88 The scope of the S.A.R.'s autonomy will be affected by interpretations in these fields.
89 See Id.
90 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
92 A term coined by the author.
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solution to a given problem. The choice of options therefore involves
first a judgment of what deficiency in credibility exists93 and, second, a
decision as to what ought to be done to cure the deficiency.94
In the context of "one country, two systems," the following set of
credibility norms, although of general application, help to raise the status
and protect the legitimacy and efficacy of the new legal order and thus
find a place in a functional jurisprudence.
1. The maintenance of a "high degree of autonomy"9 " is a key feature
of the Hong Kong S.A.R. which has yet to be firmly established and
tested. Therefore, measures likely to fully realize and to protect and
enhance autonomy without being inconsistent with "one country" or
with the Joint Declaration ought to be strongly favored.
2. The distinction between legal and political organs has yet to be
achieved within the P.R.C. Measures that help to separate or at least
distinguish between the two and between legal and political norms96
(without necessarily denying their ultimate relationship) and to
strengthen the independence of the judiciary and of the legal profes-
sion generally ought to be strongly favored.
3. The credibility of constitutional guarantees97 of human rights and
freedoms is dependent in part on justiciability.98 Measures that facil-
itate their legal enforcement ought to be strongly favored.
4. Constitutional guarantees, though necessary, by themselves usually
lack credibility even if justiciable. They must be respected and up-
held in practice. Steps which go beyond mere legal protection to
actual implementation or realization of rights and freedoms guaran-
teed99 ought to be strongly favored.
5. The implementation or realization of constitutional guarantees pre-
supposes or requires sound and credible institutions."a° Measures
which are designed to bring about or to protect such institutions
ought to be strongly favored so that a system of checks and balances
can be established and maintained and power is dispersed among the
institutions without creating paralysis at the center of government.
93 This is to be distinguished from various species of "rule-skepticism" which, on analysis, are
really forms of legal realism. See generally HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 120-50 (1984) (ch. VII).
94 For examples of options, see infra.
95 See Joint-Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(2).
96 See supra part II.
97 See Joint Declaration, supra note I, Annex I, § XIII; see also 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND 828-44 (4th ed. 1974).
98 One of the crucial tasks facing the legal profession in Hong Kong is to identify which parts,
if any, of the Basic Law are justiciable.
99 This goes beyond justiciability in law to the actual implementation of the rights and free-
doms guaranteed.
100 One of the most difficult tasks is to devise a system of checks and balances in which there is
dispersal of power among institutions without paralysis of power at the center.
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6. The credibility of the future Hong Kong S.A.R. system depends
largely on the continuity of many of the institutions presently ex-
isting in Hong Kong."° ' Inasmuch as these institutions currently en-
joy a large measure of credibility, measures which strengthen and
develop those institutions that are intended to be preserved basically
unchanged generally ought to be strongly favored.
An overall approach using the different norms set forth above1"2
will, it is believed, help to solve many of the problems which have arisen
or which will be encountered in the implementation of "one country, two
systems." With respect to the enigma of interpretation, the latest (and
still incomplete) preparatory draft of the Basic Law10 3 tentatively favors
a solution which contains quite a few of the elements put forward in this
Article. It combines the preservation of a review incidenter system in the
S.A.R. with aprincipaliter system of legislative interpretation to be exer-
cised by the Standing Committee of the N.P.C. It places the final power
of adjudication within the S.A.R. system and supplies an interface via a
Basic Law Advisory Committee.1 4 This Committee, whose composition
is yet to be finalized, serves a role envisaged to include advising the
Standing Committee of the N.P.C. on the interpretation and amendment
of the Basic Law and the validity of S.A.R. laws. The reconciliation of
the powers of the Standing Committee under the P.R.C. Constitution
with the final power of adjudication of the S.A.R. courts is sought to be
achieved principally by adopting the aforementioned rule105 that no deci-
sion of the Standing Committee shall affect the results of cases finally
adjudicated in the S.A.R. The Standing Committee's decision will how-
ever have prospective effect. Unfortunately, the preliminary model fa-
vored in the draft will leave unresolved major difficulties (e.g., in relation
to the scope of the S.A.R. courts' jurisdiction, the problems of classifica-
tion of issues, and the precise relationship between review incidenter of
the S.A.R. courts and review principilater of the Standing Committee).106
In the writer's view, the preliminary model falls critically short of a
system 1) whereby political and legal functions (insofar as they are distin-
guishable despite their interrelationship) are sufficiently and credibly sep-
101 The Joint Declaration identifies many of these institutions, e.g. the legal profession, the
judiciary, the established religious organisations, etc.
102 See supra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.
103 See COLLECTION OF DRAFr ARTICLES, supra note 52.
104 See id. ch. 9.
105 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text. The terms of reference and composition of
the Basic Law Advisory Committee (called the "HKSAR Basic Law Committee" in the Draft Arti-
cles) have yet to be defined although broad indications are given in the Draft Articles as to its
functions. One of the functions indicated in article 169 of the Draft Articles is giving advice on
amendments to the Basic Law; this clearly implies apolitical function in addition to legal functions.
COLLECTION OF DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 52, art. 169 (ch. 9).
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arated and 2) where the powers of an essentially political body such as
the Standing Committee of the N.P.C. are sufficiently and credibly de-
fined and circumscribed by justiciable and legally enforceable provisions,
or at least by directive principles.'" 7 Thus, the preliminary model is still
seriously deficient in credibility and everything possible must be done to
remove this deficiency.108
V. BEYOND A FUNCTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL-REALIST
VIEW OF LAW
This Article so far has explored the foundations of the new jurispru-
dence mainly in terms of its function and of its usefulness and credibility
in problem solving. 109 Such a result-oriented approach has severe limita-
tions but is at this stage necessary for a number of reasons. In the first
place, overemphasis on ideological purity is unlikely to help Hong Kong
in the paradoxical situation in which it finds itself: on the one hand, the
P.R.C. is still wedded to socialism with all its "insistences" (jianchi)"
and, on the other hand, free market economics are, in accordance with
the Joint Declaration, being insistently turned into consitutional guaran-
tees for the future Hong Kong S.A.R. t t ' Secondly, in the growing dia-
logue between practicing lawyers from the two systems, the emphasis
tends to be on law as business and technology rather than law as politics
and ideology. This is perfectly natural at a time when the P.R.C. is using
law as an instrument of modernization" 2 which is often identified with
technological progress and when-patriotism... aside-the easiest bridge
to build across the great ideological divide between the two systems is via
the P.R.C.'s new Economic Law." 4 Thirdly, it is surely not enough to
107 See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
1o8 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (the "credibility norms").
109 See supra part IV.
110 The four "insistences" embodied in the preamble to the P.R.C. Constitution are upholding
"the leadership of the C.C.P.," "Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought," "the people's dem-
ocratic dictatorship" and "the socialist road." P.R.C. CONST. preamble.
111 The Joint Declaration promises to preserve, by way of the Basic Law, not only the capitalist
life style but also "the capitalist economic and trade systems previously practised in Hong Kong,"
the "monetary and financial systems previously practised in Hong Kong," the "free operation of
financial business and free flow of capital within, into and out of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region," "no exchange control[s]," freely convertible currency, etc. Joint Declaration, supra note 1,
Annex I, §§ VI, VII. The irony is that it is a communist government that is making such a law.
112 See supra part II.
113 "Patriotism" is likely to become an increasingly important concept, depending on how it is
defined in such contexts as national unity, freedom of speech and of religion; it may even by em-
ployed as a substitute in certain areas for nationalism.
114 Economic Law will probably be among the first areas of law to be harmonized, in part,
between the two systems. It is, however, far from an ideology-free zone; it is governed by numerous
fangzhen (see part II), for example, the norm "[l]et things foreign serve China, but let China specify
the course!" echoes the "ti-yung" philosophy of the Confucian scholar Chang Chih-tung (c. 1898)
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merely ask questions; we must come up with some practical answers to
meet the urgent problems encountered in the drafting of the Basic
Law,' even if, as it often happens, the most convenient and safest solu-
tion is to preserve the relevant Hong Kong system without immediately
spelling out precisely what its fundamentals are for fear that in restating
the essentials we unwittingly change them. It is the author's view that
among the more difficult and important tasks facing the legal profession
in Hong Kong is that of helping to identify the essentials of our legal
system so as to protect them more effectively both during the transitional
period and beyond.
Law is, of course, not just business or technology. Law is also integ-
rity." 6 A jurisprudence which refuses to go beyond purely functional
aspects or is too ready to sacrifice principle for the sake of expedience is
unlikely to be one which is worth pursuing. Integrity demands that we
constantly search for sound principles, correcting our oversights as we
move freely from the level of raw data to that of concepts, from concepts
to judgments (value or fact) and from there to the level of responsible
action.' 17 Law with its different nuances can make its appearance at any
or all of these four levels: as a datum to be attended to, as a concept to be
understood, as a value or fact to be reasonably affirmed and as a rule of
conduct to be observed. Such a view of and an approach to law may be
conveniently described as that of a critical realist.' It is a view and an
approach to which the writer personally subscribes and which he would
respectfully advocate.
A critical-realist view of law may even supply a new meaning and
dimension to the maxim "seeking truth from facts.""' 9 That maxim has
expressed in the dictum: "Chinese learning is for substance [ti]; Western learning is for function
[yong]." See 3. LEVENSON, I CONFUCIAN CHINA AND ITS MODERN FATE: A TRILOGY 65-70
(1968). It has been suggested that Hong Kong's capitalism is the function and the P.R.C.'s socialism
is the substance in "one country, two systems." See J.D. Young, Socialism versus Capitalism: To-
wards a Hong Kong Strategy for Absorption without Integration, in HONG KONG AND 1997: STRATE-
GIES FOR THE FUTURE 101-12 (Y.C. Jao, C.K. Leung, P. Wesley-Smith & S.L. Wong eds. 1985).
115 See supra parts III & IV.
116 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-275 (1986). The term integrity is used by the author in
a more general sense than that developed by Prof. Dworkin in his writings.
117 For an analysis of the four levels, see generally LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 27;
LONERGAN, A SECOND COLLECTION (W. Ryan & B. Tyrrell eds. year).
118 As distinguished from the critical idealism of Kant, the absolute idealism of Hegel, Fichte
and Schelling, the empiricism of Hume, and varieties of subjectivism.
119 By interposing the critical component of judgment between the datum of "fact" and the
"truth" to be sought, it is possible to avoid an unscientific determinism and at the same time under-
score the importance of paying attention to the facts and dictates of practical reason. Truth is con-
ceived of as a correspondence with a reality to be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed or
anticipated; in other words, truth is the content of correct judgments. The term "anticipated" is
used in recognition of the wide range of heuristic and other methods employed in arriving at human
understanding, including statistical methods which are not necessarily a cloak for ignorance but can
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been and continues to be powerfully invoked in the P.R.C. to justify the
building up of a new legal order and the laying down of a whole range of
pragmatic policies by underlining the need to be attentive to "objective
realities."' 120 This represents part of a larger and continuing effort by
P.R.C. theoreticians and jurists to transcend, without necessarily repudi-
ating, the narrow categories of a more backward age.12' Thus, we find
that Peng Zhen, head of the legislative commission of the P.R.C., echoed
these sentiments in May 1981 stating:
Our civil law is the civil law of the People's Republic of China. It
is not the civil law of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe; neither is it
Anglo-American, Continental European or Japanese civil law. What
is the source of our civil law? It must originate from the reality of
China. 122
Many examples can be given of new ideas being tested within the
P.R.C. which are said to originate from the reality of China. One vivid
example is the daring concept of a rural contract-management house-
hold 123 which can, within the scope allowed by law, undertake produc-
tion according to the law of contract. Another example is the
"entrepreneurial legal person "1 24 with a personality divided between ca-
pacity of ownership and managerial authority. A third example, of a
more general kind, is the rapid development of Economic Law as a dis-
tinct discipline which is at least initially supposed to govern principally
"vertical, administrative relations' '1 25 as distinguished from the Civil
Law which is supposed at this stage of development to serve principally
"lateral or horizontal relations."1
26
The specific examples mentioned are still all essentially result-ori-
ented, and naturally so given the prevailing political norms previously
discussed. 127 The examples do contain, however, the seeds for develop-
ment of a more general concept of law. Indeed, there are signs of devel-
opment within the P.R.C. of a Chinese-style theory of natural law based
on "objective needs."' 28 One articulation of the theory is the "common
yield real insight into things. The law has to deal often not only with what is but also with what can
reasonably be anticipated.
120 See supra part II.
121 For examples, see infra.
122 People's Daily, May 15, 1986, at 4; The "Civil Law's General Rules", CHINA NEws ANAL-
Ysis, June 15, 1986, at 2 (no. 1312).
123 Civil Law's General Rules, art. 27 (promulgated Apr. 12, 1986 at the 6th N.P.C., 4th
Sess.).
124 This is another concept embodied in the Civil Law's General Rules. See id.
125 People's Daily, Apr. 17, 1986, at 2.
126 Id.
127 See supra notes 69-89 and accompanying text.
128 The Rise of Economic Law, CHINA NEWS ANALYSIS, June 18, 1984, at 7 (no. 1263).
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nature of law" (falu gongtong xing)12 9 inspired by a need of some P.R.C.
jurists to go beyond, without denying, the class character of law forming
part of Marxist analysis. For this reason, this new conception of law is
described as having a "beyond class" character while professing to re-
spect historical and present realities.13 0
It is necessary to indicate how a critical-realist view of law is likely
to help develop the new or, indeed, any jurisprudence. Critical realism in
law is not engaged in partisan politics and is, in that sense, politically
neutral. Its method is basically the same as that involved in any act of
human understanding"3 ' and thus is rooted in reason and common sense,
yet willing to submit even common sense and "objective realities" to crit-
ical judgment. It differs from legal realism 132 in that while it accepts that
law involves predictions of how the relevant rules will be interpreted and
applied in real life, it asks the further questions as to why a gap exists
between law in action and law in the books and what, if anything, can be
done about it. Critical realism differs from legal positivism 33 in that
while it sees elements of truth in the notion of law as "the command of
the sovereign,"' 34 it is aware of the rich variety of norms which are by no
means restricted to rules of compulsion but also include rules of facilita-
tion, validation and recognition. 135 More importantly, it asks the prior
question of whether a rule or its sanction for breach is just and otherwise
in accordance with reason and good sense, and the further question of
what must be done if it is not. In so doing, it does not ignore but instead
affirms the good of order which in normal circumstances requires us to
respond to a law perceived to be unjust not by denying its character as
law but by taking steps on the level of responsible action for its amend-
ment or repeal.
Critical realism includes within its vision law as a collaborative and
interpretative enterprise seeking, in an adjudicative context, "the best
constructive interpretation of the community's legal practice"'136 but,
where appropriate, it goes outside such a context to evaluate the practice
129 See Wan & Ni, A Preliminary Study of the Common Nature of Laws, SHEHuI KEXUE
(Social Sciences), Sept. 1983, at 57-62. Contrast Xu, On the Correct Analysis of the Nature of Law,
SHEHUI KEXUE (Social Sciences), Feb. 1985, at 46-47.
130 See Wan Bin, A Third Study of the General Character of Laws, SHEHUI KEXUE (Social
Sciences), July 1985, at 27-29; Wu On Several Problems of Methodology in the Controversies Regard-
ing the "General Character of Laws," SHEHUI KEXUE (Social Sciences), Sept. 1985, at 44-46.
131 For the four levels, see supra note 119.
132 For the Scandinavian variety of legal realism, see -XGERSTROM, INQUIRIES INTO THE NA-
TURE OF LAW AND MORALs (Broad trans. 1953); OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT (1939). Cf. M.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1974).
133 See AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1954).
134 Id.
135 See HART, supra note 93.
136 DWORKIN, supra note 116.
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itself. It is familiar with empirical methods as well as semantic and eco-
nomic theories of law137 but strives to rise above partial perspectives to
find the overall intelligibility of law (including its efficacy and legitimacy)
not merely in the language of the rule or its economics but also and prin-
cipally in the reason for the rule, the authority that issues it and the com-
mon good that it must serve.138  It recognizes in the hierarchy of
individual or communitarian needs a ground for a hierarchy of norms
but parts company with any "pure theory of law" 1 39 that is little more
than an ard and fragile artifact of legal positivism.
Critical realism is, thus, very much at home with the better articu-
lated versions of natural law that appeal to a reality to be intelligently
grasped and reasonably affirmed or anticipated,"4 thus helping to pre-
empt or correct any arbitrariness in positive law. Such an appeal moves
from the descriptive to the explanatory and does not confuse is with
ought while recognizing the creative tension between the two, as well as
the deep relationship between many but not all aspects of law and moral-
ity.' 4 ' A critical realist conceives "nature" not in static terms but heuris-
tically, as a dynamic reality in a world mediated by meaning. 42 In this
way, he expects to discover clues for the laying down, on the one hand, of
sensible and flexible rules that are subject to development and change
and, on the other hand, of a set of no less intelligible but lasting and even
absolute principles that should find a place in every civilized legal system.
The critical realist retains, on balance, not only a healthy skepticism that
wisely sets limits to rules of compulsion but also an essential openness
that will help to make human freedom and progress a reality.
It is hoped that as the tale of two systems unfolds, law will within its
proper sphere become established as a principle, a product as well as a
means of mediation between the systems. This hope is, however, unlikely
to be realized if the promises contained in the Joint Declaration are not
solemnly kept. It is on this note of realism that the author wishes to
conclude a discussion which, despite its abstract elements, fully recog-
137 See R.W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW-A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281-92 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
Critical realism is not the same as although it could, of course, itself be the subject of "Critical
Legal Studies." For a bibliography of critical legal studies literature, see Kennedy & Kare, A Bibli-
ography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461, 464-90 (1984).
138 For an analysis of "the common good," see J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 153-56 (1979).
139 Cf. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1949).
140 Although not in so many words. See ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, ii, ch. 8 (Charlton trans. 1970);
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, QUAESTIONES 90-97. See also LONERGAN supra note 27; FINNIS
supra note 138.
141 See HART, supra note 93.
142 As distinguished both from the world of immediacy of an infant and from the static classi-
cist world view.
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nizes within proper limits the instrumentality of law and the need for
pragmatism. If a critical realist submits pragmatism to judgment, it is
not because he is unrealistic, but because an uncritical realism is a con-
tradiction in terms.

